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Abstract (226 words): 
‘Serendipity’ is a category used to describe discoveries in science that occur at the 
intersection of chance and wisdom. In this paper, I argue for understanding 
serendipity in science as an emergent property of scientific discovery, describing 
an oblique relationship between the outcome of a discovery process and the 
intentions that drove it forward. The recognition of serendipity is correlated with 
an acknowledgment of the limits of expectations about potential sources of 
knowledge. I provide an analysis of serendipity in science as a defense of this 
definition and its implications, drawing from theoretical and empirical research on 
experiences of serendipity as they occur in science and elsewhere. I focus on 
three interrelated features of serendipity in science. First, there are variations of 
serendipity. The process of serendipitous discovery can be complex. Second, a 
valuable outcome must be obtained before reflection upon the significance of the 
unexpected observation or event in respect to that outcome can take place. 
Therefore, serendipity is retrospectively categorized. Third, the primacy of 
epistemic expectations is elucidated. Finally, I place this analysis within 
discussions in philosophy of science regarding the impact of interpersonal 
competition upon the number and significance of scientific discoveries. Thus, the 
analysis of serendipity offered in this paper contributes to discussions about the 
social-epistemological aspects of scientific discovery and has normative 







Serendipity is a category used to describe discoveries that occur at the intersection of chance and 
wisdom. To quote the word’s inventor, Horace Walpole, it describes “discoveries [made] by accidents 
and sagacity, of things [the observers]1 were not in quest of” (1754, quoted in Merton and Barber 2004, 
p. 2). This paper brings together the work of philosophers of science with results of the empirical study 
of experiences researchers and others have had of serendipity, including the reflections of practicing 
scientists in diverse fields. I show that serendipity in science is best understood when looked at within 
the broader context of the scientific community, rather than narrowly through the lens of individual 
experience. At the level of the individual, serendipity points to a discovery marked by a surprising 
insight; at the community level, the role of epistemic expectations—both enabling surprise and 
determining the response to surprise—is illuminated. In turn, my approach has implications for how the 
scientific community ought to be structured, in order to maximize the benefits of serendipitous 
discovery for scientists, science and society.  
I argue that serendipity is an emergent property of scientific discoveries, describing an oblique 
relationship between the outcome of a discovery process and the intentions that drove it forward. This 
definition arises from the close examination of several key features of serendipity relevant to its impact 
on the practice of science. These features together provide a paradoxical picture of serendipitous 
discovery: it requires both luck and skill, and is both unpredictable and yet can be cultivated. The 
purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that, when the context of the scientific community is properly 
taken into account, the individual experience of serendipitous discovery is no longer paradoxical. In 
communities that allow diverse members opportunities to contribute to the production of knowledge, 
there will both be more opportunities for serendipitous discovery and community members will develop 
the skills necessary to take advantage of those opportunities.  
The first three sections of the paper address the relevant features of serendipity in science. First, 
serendipity has many variations. Analyses of serendipity commonly focus on an insightful, cognitive 
connection made by a ‘serendipitous’ individual. However, serendipity as experienced by scientists and 
by others consists of multiple kinds of connections, including social relationships and timeliness. Further, 
serendipitous discovery is a process rather than an event, and can be marked by several intersections of 
chance and wisdom that enable the valuable outcome. Second, serendipitous discovery is profoundly 
contingent upon contextual factors, beyond the insight of the serendipitous individual. Because it is 
both contingent and inherently unpredictable, serendipity can only be used retrospectively as a category 
to describe scientific discoveries. Further, the insight of the individual is insufficient for bringing about a 
serendipitous, scientific discovery—such discovery processes are also dependent on environmental 
factors, and the structure of the community of which the individual is a member. It is within this 
complex network of interacting factors that the three elements of serendipity come together, and it is 
from this complex network that serendipitous discovery emerges. Third, serendipity occurs when the 
limitations of epistemic expectations are exposed: a discovery is serendipitous because it arises from an 
unexpected source of knowledge, or because knowledge is produced in an unexpected way. Specific 
skills, in fact, are associated with serendipitous discovery, but the exercise of these skills is dependent 
on external factors, such as timeliness and community support, for its success. By establishing these 
features, I provide a defense of my definition of serendipity. In the fourth and final section, this paper 
makes an explicit contribution to ongoing discussions in philosophy of science, pointing to one 
                                                          
1 Walpole is specifically referring here to the Princes of Serendip, characters in a fairy tale who inspired him to 





implication of my analysis for the structure of science. My understanding of how serendipity works in 
science grounds a normative framework that affirms the value of early publication, both for individual 
scientists and for science itself.  
1. Variations of Serendipity 
In analyses of serendipity, the focus is often on the serendipitous individual’s insight that an unexpected 
observation or event has value, despite its being anomalous or even in conflict with prevailing 
knowledge. A classic example is the narrative of the gregarious Barry Marshall, who stubbornly persisted 
against the grain of prevailing wisdom to convince gastroenterologists that ulcers could be caused by 
bacteria. This ability to perceive the potential value of an unexpected observation is frequently 
associated with the intellectual capacity of an individual to make some sort of “connection” between 
the observation and previously held knowledge. Often this is cashed out in light of Louis Pasteur’s 
famous dictum, that “chance favours only prepared minds” (1854, quoted in van Andel 1994, pp. 634-5).  
Many theorists of serendipity have given a primarily cognitive account of the wisdom involved in 
recognizing potential value in the unexpected. James Austin (2003) defines what he calls the “Pasteur 
Principle”: “Some special receptivity born from past experience permits you to discern a new fact or to 
perceive ideas in a new relationship, and go on to comprehend their significance” (p. 76). Miguel Piña e 
Cunha and colleagues (Cunha et al. 2010) take up Arthur Koestler’s (1964) term of “bisociation” as the 
“functional basis for metaphorical thinking…Bisociation entails an exercise of intuition, the intuitive 
recognition of possibilities…when ideas are combined in an original way” (Cunha et al. 2010, pp. 321 & 
323). Similarly, Mark de Rond (2014) suggests that the key component of serendipity is an intellectual 
capability for making “‘matching pairs’ of events…that are meaningfully…related” (p. 1, emphasis his). 
Other theorists have used the Peircian term “abduction” to capture the kind of inferential reasoning that 
goes into evaluating the potential value of an unexpected observation (e.g.: Darbellay et al. 2014, p. 5; 
van Andel 1994, pp. 635ff).2 According to Paul Thagard, the serendipitous moment in a scientific 
discovery is marked by a “conceptual combination” (Thagard 2012, p. 392). 
Such intellectual connections are described by Gary Fine and James Deegan (1996) as instances of 
“analytical serendipity.” Analytical serendipity is only one of three categories of serendipity Fine and 
Deegan identify in the autobiographical narratives of ethnographers. They also identify two other 
categories, “temporal serendipity” and “serendipity relations.” Temporal serendipity describes the 
inclusion of a dramatic but unexpected event in an ethnographer’s tale, one that allowed the narrator to 
participate in aspects of a culture they would otherwise have missed altogether.3 The category of 
                                                          
2 Of course, in philosophical discussion about the logic or rationality of scientific discovery, there is a deep and 
complicated debate concerning abduction (see work by Peirce, Paavola, Hanson, Hintikka, for example). How well 
abduction works as a description of the reasoning involved in some cases of serendipity (see the following 
paragraphs) is a topic I pursue elsewhere, and is outside of the scope of this paper.   
3 This is also frequently called synchronicity in the serendipity literature, following Jung: “simultaneous occurrence 
of two meaningfully but not causally connected events” (as quoted in Liestman 1992, p.527). Daniel Liestman’s 
(1992) use of synchronicity as one category of serendipity in library research is picked up by several others, from 
fields such as computer-human interaction (Kefalidou & Sharples 2016), education (Nutefall & Ryder 2010) and 
information studies (Foster & Ellis 2014). Synchronicity is also appealed to by organizational and management 
theorists (see Cunha 2005 for further references). However, I follow Lawley and Tompkins (2008), who draw a 
distinction between synchronicity and serendipity, because the former is recognized immediately whereas the 





serendipity relations describes “the unplanned building of social networks” (Fine & Deegan 1996, p. 
438). It includes the people we meet unexpectedly, who turn out to be sources of valuable knowledge or 
who lead to further valuable connections (Fine & Deegan 1996, p. 440). Temporal serendipity and 
serendipity relations are instances in which serendipity goes beyond the cognitive: connections made 
between people, or ones being present at the right time and in the right place, can just as well lead to 
valuable discoveries.  
Examples of serendipitous connections that are temporal or social, rather than or as well as intellectual, 
are found throughout contemporary descriptions of serendipitous science. A serendipitous discovery 
process in science can involve multiple kinds of serendipity. Tales of serendipity often include the details 
of life that led individuals to be in the right time, place and circumstances to make a discovery.  
For instance, the story of Marshall’s serendipitous discovery of the bacterial cause of stomach ulcers 
tends to focus on his role as spokesperson for his own discovery. However, Paul Thagard provides a 
detailed recounting of the discovery in which we see how Marshall’s good fortune in having the right 
social connections and available resources enabled him to succeed (Thagard 1998a, 1998b). In James 
Estes’ (2016) scientific autobiography, the author recounts several different kinds of serendipity. At 
times, Estes happened to meet the right person, with whom he could continue his work (pp. 101, 108, 
116). Some people he met guided his research in a distinct way (pp. 29, 37, 191). Circumstances put him 
in the right place and time to make key observations (pp. 28, 108, 148). External events also affected the 
path he took as a scientist (pp. 21, 33, 167, 203-4). When reflecting upon these instances in his past, 
Estes sees them—and, consequently, the scientific discoveries they enabled him to make—as 
serendipitous (pp. 3, 230).  
Howard Gest (1997) offers another example, when he notes the importance of an unexpected social 
connection between labs in the isolation of vitamin C. A former graduate student (Joseph L. Svirbely) of 
Charles King who had been working with King on the problem of scurvy wound up, via “a serendipitous 
event,” working in the lab of Albert Szent-Gyorgyi in Hungary. It was this unexpected social connection 
that led to the testing of Szent-Gyorgyi’s sample of a chemical he had isolated and called hexuronic acid, 
to confirm it was indeed vitamin C. Consequently, this unexpected social connection led to Szent-
Gyorgyi’s receiving a Nobel Prize for that work (Gest 1997, pp. 22-24). In Gest’s (1997) words, Svirbely 
the PhD student had become an “accidental agent,” connecting the research happening in otherwise 
isolated labs (p. 24).  
Hindsight has the effect of reifying a complex process as a linear sequence of events, and serendipity 
narratives often rhetorically trace the origin of a discovery to a “magic moment” in time (de Rond and 
Morley 2010, p. 7). Likewise, scientific processes are often only retrospectively recognized as leading to 
discovery (Fleck 1979). Thomas Nickles points out that this retrospective classification of a particular 
series of events as leading to discovery can have a rarefying effect on our perception of the originating 
event: 
What we retrospectively interpret as revolutionary breakthroughs typically begin life as rather 
normal work. Over time, by telescoping historical development, scientists whiggishly invest these 
charmed cases with far more meaning than they originally possessed…Most analysts of scientific 
discovery fail to notice that much or most of what we count as “the discovery” is actually 
accomplished in the reworking and refinement that occurs in the years and decades following the 





As Nickles notes, events that follow the “origin moment” have as much to do with making the discovery 
as the moment itself. In fact, when a discovery narrative is told there is often a choice to be made as to 
which event attributes the property of serendipity to the discovery. The story of penicillin’s discovery, 
for instance, contains multiple chance events and coincidences, and the discovery was not a direct or 
even predictable result of Alexander Fleming’s insight in shielding the infamous petri dish from the 
wash.4 As Gest comments regarding the narrative of the vitamin C discovery:   
The fateful connections and sequelae involving King, Svirbely, and Szent-Gyorgyi were, in fact, 
quite complicated and even now, difficult to sort out…A number of serendipic [sic] events were 
involved in the vitamin C story, but none of them can be said to be the crucial event or 
“accident.” (Gest 1997, p. 23-24, emphasis his). 
In sum, serendipity in the practice of science is more ubiquitous than momentous. Robert Merton 
pointed to this first when he described what he called the “serendipity pattern”: “observing an 
unanticipated, anomalous and strategic datum which becomes the occasion for developing a new 
theory or for extending an existing theory,” a “fairly common experience” (Merton 1948, p. 506, 
emphasis his, then mine). I argue that it not only describes the greater-than-average-value discoveries 
that arose with the help of chance, such as penicillin, but also the networks of accidental connections 
later recognized as valuable (Copeland 2015; see also McCay-Peet & Wells 2017, p. 99). These include 
connections between ideas, people, places, experiences, and more. When such connections happen 
during a discovery process, any one of them may lead to the categorization of the discovery itself as 
serendipitous. Thus, a process of serendipitous discovery is likely to involve participation from multiple 
scientists, in one way or another, and to extend across time. In contrast to the individualistic depiction 
of serendipity as a “flash of insight” then, we have a picture of serendipity as occurring within a 
community, involving networks of individuals and interactions (McBirnie & Urquhart 2011).  
2. Retrospectivity & Emergence 
Thagard provides an excellent case study in his detailed description of one of the more popular 
examples of serendipity in the literature, the discovery of H. pylori and its relationship to ulcers, for 
which Barry Marshall and Robin Warren were awarded a Nobel Prize (Thagard 1998a, 1998b). Thagard 
himself uses serendipity to describe two distinct events in the discovery process as a whole: the 
observation of bacteria in the stomach, and the discovery of how to cultivate the bacteria in the lab. 
Warren was not searching for bacteria in the stomach when he found it, during the course of his 
everyday work as a pathologist. As Thagard comments, “he just happened to examine gastric specimens 
with sufficient microscope magnification to make bacteria visible” (1998a, p. 114). At the time this 
observation was made, the stomach was thought to be a sterile environment in which bacteria could not 
survive, and so the observation was unexpected. Thus, the discovery of H. pylori bacteria in the stomach 
by Warren was serendipitous. For Thagard, the value of this serendipity is that it generated questions 
                                                          
4 There are many chance aspects of even this observation, including the perfect temperature fluctuations in 
London at the right time, an open door to a stairwell, and Fleming’s vacation (Diggins 2003). Chance marked the 
path to penicillin’s mass-production as well—to name one instance, lab assistant Mary Hunt was at the local 
market when she picked up a moldy cantaloupe, which led to the discovery of a better medium for penicillin’s 
production, despite the hundreds of samples sent from afar to the lab for just that purpose. The insightful assistant 





for the curious Warren, who then pursued investigation of the bacteria with the help of a 
gastroenterologist, Marshall. Serendipity here is a surprising observation that leads to a new direction of 
inquiry.  
Similarly, serendipity played a role in Marshall’s later discovery of how to cultivate the bacteria in the 
lab. Attempts to cultivate it repeatedly failed at first. It was then accidentally discovered that the forty-
eight hours given to allow growth was insufficient—the distraction of a busy schedule and the 
coincidence of a four-day weekend provided the solution, allowing the bacteria five days to cultivate 
(Thagard 1998a, p. 114). In this case, serendipity is a chance event that leads to an unexpected solution 
to a problem.  
Thagard separates out these serendipity-moments because they are marked by surprise and chance, in 
contrast to the intentional phases of questioning and search that followed (Thagard 1998a; 2002, p. 90). 
However, as Alan Baumeister, Mike Hawkins and Francisco López-Muñoz (2010) illustrate in their 
analysis of the history of serendipity in psychopharmacology, this treatment of a single discovery 
process as a series of moments can be confusing. For instance, they consider two seemingly 
contradictory claims made by John Cade, who discovered that lithium was an effective treatment for 
mania. Cade claimed both that the discovery was unexpected and that the expected result of a clinical 
trial in humans was a reduction in mania (Baumeister et al. 2010, p. 265).  Baumeister and colleagues 
resolve this contradiction by breaking the discovery of lithium as a treatment for mania into two, distinct 
discovery processes—one serendipitous (an unexpected observation that lithium had lethargy-inducing 
effects on guinea pigs) and one non-serendipitous (the rational pursuit of lithium’s therapeutic 
application in a clinical trial).  
However, the observation that lithium had lethargy-inducing effects on guinea pigs was not valuable 
until its effectiveness in treating mania was recognized; until the ‘second’ discovery was made, the ‘first’ 
discovery was not considered a serendipitous discovery in psychopharmacology. Cade himself may have 
thought it an interesting and valuable observation at the time, but only upon confirming its value to 
science and medicine did it become an episode in a narrative about a discovery, leading to the confusion 
pointed to by Baumeister and colleagues. As does Thagard, Baumeister and colleagues break a process 
into serendipitous and non-serendipitous moments, events or discoveries in order to clarify the 
interaction between intentional and non-intentional aspects of a discovery process. However, these 
distinctions are misleading when it comes to understanding serendipity itself. In particular, they prevent 
analysis of two key aspects of serendipity in science, retrospectivity and emergence.  
I argue rather that classifying a discovery as serendipitous points to the impact of one or more 
unexpected events upon a process that is not complete until the valuable outcome has been 
determined. To understand how serendipity happens we must look at the interconnection between 
insight, the unexpected event(s) and the valuable outcome together (Copeland 2015; Solomon 2017, p. 
5; McCay-Peet & Wells 2017, p. 103). Not only is it often arbitrary to distinguish one unexpected 
connection as “the crucial event,” as Gest puts it in the quotation above, but what gives meaning to the 
moment of surprise—what makes it serendipitous—includes the value of the outcome, as well as 
characteristics inherent in the moment itself. 
Consider a case of “serendipity lost”—an unexpected insight that, although wise and marked by 





publication detailing a discovery that was never made5—one example has been described in detail by 
Bernard Barber and Renée Fox (1958). They tell the tale of the floppy eared rabbits: an observation of a 
reaction in their experimental rabbit population made by two scientists at almost the same time, both of 
whom were insightful enough to recognize it was an interesting observation that ought to be followed 
up. Only one of the scientists, however, actually did follow it up sufficiently to make a discovery about 
the effects of papain on the cellular structure of the ear cartilage. There was no real difference between 
the two scientists’ original observations, as Barber and Fox point out—both observations were 
unexpected, and both inspired an insightful curiosity in the observers. What made the difference to the 
discovery were the events that followed that observation, and the obtainment of the valuable outcome 
in one case but not the other. As a result, Dr. Kellner was not serendipitous in respect to this 
observation, driven down other paths of research instead. For Dr. Thomas, the serendipitous scientist in 
this story, “the planned and the unplanned, the foreseen and the accidental, the logical and the 
lucky…continued to interact” beyond the original observations to keep him on the path to this particular 
valuable outcome (Barber & Fox 1958, p. 134).  
Thus, serendipity is a category that can only be applied retrospectively to a discovery process, once the 
valuable outcome has been determined and upon reflection on the now-apparent significance of the 
relevant unexpected events and insight.6 One never says, “This is going to be serendipitous”—not only 
because it often occurs by chance, but also because until the value of the discovery is made clear, the 
category of serendipity does not yet apply.7 In fact, empirical research shows that a period of reflection 
is necessary for the observer to recognize the significance of the chance event and the wisdom of her 
own insights.  
In light of qualitative data acquired through interviews with academic researchers, artists, library users 
and laypeople, several versions of a process model of serendipity have been developed (Cunha 2005; 
Lawley & Tompkins 2008; McCay-Peet & Toms 2010; Rubin et al. 2011; Makri and Blandford 2012).8 
These process models all include the outcome as a necessary step in serendipitous discovery. Further, 
many of them highlight its retrospectivity and the necessity of reflection upon previous events before 
the category is applied. Consider this version by Stephann Makri and Ann Blandford (2012): 
                                                          
5 A possible exception is Alexander Kohn’s (1989) book, Fortune and Failure: Missed Opportunities and Chance 
Discoveries in Science. However, as with the example given by Barber and Fox, the ‘forgotten’ discoveries in this 
book are only seen as such in light of the discoveries that were (later) actually made.  
6 Given the quotation from Nickles above, one might extend this retrospectivity to many discovery processes, but 
since it would not extend to all processes categorized as discovery processes (since some are indeed intentional, 
for example, and therefore prospective), ‘serendipity’ remains a particular classification within that broader 
category (ie: a kind of discovery process that is recognized retrospectively).  
7 Of course, in some cases this timeline is collapsed, such as when the value of the discovery is clear at the time of 
observation. One example might be when a collector of fine garden gnomes happens by chance to visit a friend 
whose neighbor is holding a garage sale and selling a gnome whose value the collector is able to identify 
immediately. But more often, including in the examples Walpole himself gives and (I would argue) almost always in 
the case of scientific discovery, multiple steps are required to reveal the true value of the unexpected finding. And 
still, the gnome collector could not have known her visit to the friend would be serendipitous beforehand (or it 
wouldn’t have been, by definition).  
8 Cunha (2005) and Lawley and Tompkins (2008) developed the first process models through an analysis of case 
studies and the literature. The later articles cited here refer to studies that confirmed and refined that model via 






Figure 1: Makri and Blandford's  
empirical process model (2012, fig.2) 
 
Because of the retrospective nature of the category, the fact an unexpected event, meeting or 
observation was serendipitous is determined by reflection upon the value of the result of a process 
during which that event, meeting or observation played a key role. First, note that this process is often 
iterative, rather than strictly linear (see also Lawley & Tompkins 2008; McCay-Peet & Wells 2017, p. 
102). Before the value of the outcome is established, several iterations of “reflect upon the value,” 
“project the value,” and “exploit the connection” may occur. Along the way, other outcomes of value 
may be obtained and there may be several moments in which chance intersects with wisdom. But the 
process of serendipitous discovery is not complete until a particular outcome is obtained such that it 
results in the perception of at least one of those moments as unexpectedly valuable in relation to that 
outcome. Only then is the “mix of unexpected circumstances and insight” (together with the outcome) 
considered an instance of serendipity.  
Second, the value assigned to the moment and the outcome together is oblique in relation to the 
intentions that (initially) drove the underlying process forward. That is, the intentions behind the activity 
taking place at the time of the unexpected observation or event are only indirectly related to the 
outcome of the process, the serendipitous discovery. In Walpole’s words, “many excellent discoveries 
have been made by men who were á la chasse of something quite different” (1789).  
This holds for cases of so-called pseudoserendipity as well. The term “pseudoserendipity,” coined by 
Royston Roberts (1989), suggests that a distinction should be made from “pure serendipity” in cases 
when the observer may have been seeking the knowledge she accidentally found. One example is 
Charles Goodyear’s discovery of the vulcanization of rubber. The actual discovery was accidental—
Goodyear had not planned to heat the rubber compound he was working with when it (accidentally) 
came into contact with a hot stove. However, he was in general looking for a method to enable rubber 
to withstand the cold, and such a method was revealed by his mistake. Because Goodyear was looking 
for just such a solution, but found it in an unexpected place, Roberts feels this example does not capture 
the essence of serendipity (Roberts 1989, pp. 54-55). However, the outcome is still obliquely related to 





not include a hypothesis about vulcanization. The value of heating rubber was unknown at the time the 
rubber was spilled and so was determinable only retrospectively, once the effects were observed and 
their application surmised.  
Similarly, as Aharon Kantorovich argues in his book-length treatment of serendipity in science (1993), 
processes of discovery frequently end in a way unpredictable from the perspective of their origins. 
Because other scientists will take an observation and work with it, new purposes and new knowledge 
inevitably arise that do not reflect the intentions of the original observer in making and disseminating 
the observation itself. The observer, in Kantorovich’s words, remains “blind” to the ultimate value of the 
observation (1993, pp. 153-154). It is this oblique relationship with the intentions driving the underlying 
process—the reasons behind the actions being taken at the time—that marks serendipitous discovery. 
The outcome, indeed, emerges from the processes and intentions (and other features of the context) at 
hand. 
For instance, take the origin of the word itself, in the fairy tale that Walpole recounted in his 1754 letter 
to More. The princes of Serendip were on the road to Persia when they made observations that, later, 
when they encountered a person with a problem (having lost his camel), became useful in solving that 
very problem. At the time of making the observations, the princes could not have known they would 
encounter the camel driver who needed that knowledge. Nonetheless, they recognized their 
observations were interesting and potentially valuable, and readily recalled them when they could be 
used. A (serendipitous) collaboration between them and the camel driver thus emerged when he 
presented them with a problem to which they (unexpectedly) had the solution. 
An emergent property can be described as novel in the sense that it cannot be reduced to the properties 
that exist in the underlying process or context from which it arose (Clayton 2006). A popular example is 
the idea that consciousness “emerges” from the neural networks of the brain. In the tale of the princes 
of Serendip, the property of serendipity emerges from the interaction of the princes’ observations with 
the further context of the camel driver’s problem, and not from any properties inherent in the 
observations (or in the camel driver’s problem) themselves.9 As David Chalmers (2006) points out, 
however, emergence is used in science and philosophy to express two distinct concepts. What is often 
called “weak emergence” is defined epistemologically, as the result of a limitation in our understanding 
of events, objects, and their properties. In contrast, “strong emergence” suggests that the emergent 
phenomenon cannot be deduced, even in principle, from the properties of the underlying context or 
process from which it arises. Considering serendipity in light of this debate draws out both why the term 
applies to serendipity as well as the nature of the role epistemic expectations play in serendipitous 
discovery. 
One might consider serendipity as an example of weak emergence, because it seems that only our 
epistemic limitations make it unexpected. However, even if it were possible to rationally reconstruct the 
process involved in some past incident of serendipity perfectly, thereby enabling us to explain (and, in 
principle, predict) how that event occurred, this does not mean it is not a case of strong emergence 
(Anjum & Mumford 2017, p. 104). Further, both the state of knowledge in science and the environment 
in which it is practiced continues to change, and so the complex interaction of factors that enables a 
                                                          
9 See Anjum and Mumford (2017) for an example of an account of emergent properties as those properties that do 





serendipitous discovery to occur in one instance will not be repeated in the next. The ability to explain a 
causal process when looking backwards does not logically entail that we could, in turn, predict that 
event when looking forward.10 Each case of serendipity arises because of epistemological limitations, 
but these limitations are part of the very nature of serendipity itself—serendipity occurs precisely when 
there is a failure to expect that a particular process will produce the valuable outcome it does. Thus, 
there are reasons to see serendipity as a case of strong emergence.  
I do not have the space here to fully explore whether serendipity is a case of weak or strong emergence, 
but wish to highlight the role of epistemic expectations by raising the question. That is, there is an 
intimate interaction in instances of serendipitous discovery between epistemic expectations—about 
where knowledge might come from, or predictions about what will happen next—and the impact of 
retrospectively recognizing serendipity upon those expectations. Serendipity, in challenging such 
expectations, changes them.  
 
3. Surprise and Epistemic Expectations 
Thagard (2002) argues that surprise is an emotional input to the questioning process that makes 
abduction both possible and useful. We are led by our surprise to reason about possible explanations for 
anomalies, for example. An important aspect of the sagacity, or wisdom involved in serendipity is this 
perception of potential value, leading an observer to attend to an unexpected observation rather than 
simply dismissing it. As Fleming did with his moldy petri dish, we look more closely because something 
has surprised us and roused our curiosity. The surprise that accompanies serendipity is not always the 
sudden and shocking kind of surprise that we experience when a jack-in-the-box springs forth, however. 
In many cases, it is more of what some call an “aha-experience”—the psychological experience of having 
a new idea about how things connect, or seeing something in a new light, or with a new sense of 
appreciation. In all cases, however, the experience is of one’s own expectations being overturned.  
While surprise and other emotional or “aha” responses to a shift in our expectations operate on the 
level of the individual, the expectations themselves derive both from personal experience and, 
importantly, from the norms of our community. The relevant norms have to do with how knowledge is 
expected to be produced, or are about who is expected to produce or contribute knowledge, for 
example. Further, the role of expectations extends beyond creating the conditions for a moment of 
surprise. Serendipitous individuals encounter the unexpected, see it as potentially valuable, and thereby 
are open to sources of knowledge in the world that exceed their own expectations. They must also be 
willing to change those expectations, upon reflection. Because serendipity is more than cognitive, but 
also includes unexpected outcomes from the formation of new relationships or one’s presence at 
certain times in certain places, the relevant expectations go further than those about what kinds of 
knowledge can be gained or even what methods might produce knowledge. New sources of knowledge 
can be unexpected results from experiments, but they can also be people from social or epistemic 
                                                          
10 Nassim Taleb provides a similar approach to what he calls Black Swans—catastrophic events that came by 
surprise (2007). Taleb highlights the fact that although in retrospect we are often able to explain how Black Swan 
events occurred, cognitive biases prevent us from predicting their occurrence beforehand. However, even if we 





communities, or new experiences, that were not previously thought to be potential sources of 
knowledge.  
Cunha and colleagues introduce a concept useful here, the idea of “generative doubt” (Cunha et al. 
2015). They analyse the case of Honda, a company often deemed serendipitous for its cornering of the 
North American market with their Super Cub motorcycles in the mid-1960s. The rapid rise to power of 
Honda in America has been explained by appeal to two separate narratives: in one, Honda is said to 
have planned well and accommodated new opportunities by being prepared; in the other, Honda is 
described as flexible and highly responsive to the changing circumstances as they unfolded. Cunha and 
colleagues suggest that a successful, serendipitous company moves between these strategic approaches 
via generative doubt. Generative doubt is, “the motivated search for understanding stimulated by the 
experience of not knowing” (Cunha et al. 2015, p. 13). As Cunha and colleagues demonstrate, this can be 
practiced on the community (organizational) level as well as by individuals. 
In the case of Honda, the company indeed had a plan for marketing in the United States, but they were 
able to adapt to a new source of valuable information when it arose. Honda intended to directly 
compete with other popular manufacturers at the time, Yamaha and Harley Davidson, but were having a 
difficult time finding a place in that market. Then their salesmen in California reported that people were 
asking them a lot of questions about the Super Cub, the small and lightweight motorcycles they 
themselves were using, and Honda changed its overall strategy. They then had huge success with their 
new ad campaign slogan, “you meet the nicest people on a Honda,” opening a new market of 
motorcycle drivers. In the language of organizational management and as Cunha and colleagues 
interpret, Honda was able to use its centralized resources for manufacturing to adapt with a “bottom-
up” strategy of taking up a suggestion from an unexpected source (Cunha et al. 2015).  
The willingness to change expectations is something that can be learned. Chris Napolitano (2013) argues 
that, “intentional…serendipitous actions” lead to “serendipitous relations” in the life of an individual. 
These intentional actions include cultivating an open attitude to unexpected events as opportunities, 
and refining the skills needed to take advantage of such opportunities when they arise. As people do not 
always realize the value of an event at the time it occurs, but rather upon reflection and in light of its 
positive outcome, these skills are generalizable and adaptable, rather than specific reactions to certain 
kinds of events. Similarly, Estes notes that a scientist will not always be able to predict the trajectory of 
her own research career, as unexpected meetings, events and observations will change its direction over 
time. Thus, in order to maximize potentially serendipitous moments along the way, one’s expectations 
about the end result of one’s intentions must remain incomplete. 
This involves not only preparedness, but also the intentional development of one’s ability to adapt to 
unexpected situations when they arise (Napolitano 2013, p. 312). As Napolitano suggests, “Simply 
recognizing an unusual event as being potentially gains-laden is not enough. An individual must seize the 
opportunities that they identify in that unexpected event” (2013, p. 304). Action must be taken to follow 
up on the insight that an unexpected event has potential value; the skills needed to take such action can 
be intentionally developed and honed. Both openness to one’s intentions leading to an unexpected 
outcome and the ability to adapt to and act upon opportunities for re-evaluating one’s own 
expectations about the outcome of a process are the types of skills relevant for serendipity. 
There are skills involved in cultivating one’s ability to recognize potential value in the unexpected, as 





temporal serendipity is not likely to be random. Ethnographers, rather, have a sense about when a 
major cultural event is likely to take place and where: “Even though events are unpredictable, types of 
events tend to occur regularly at particular times…and we depend on this patterned quality of events to 
permit us to make temporal choices about when to observe” (Fine & Deegan 1996, p. 439). Those who 
manage to hone such skills are called “super-encounterers” by Sanda Erdelez. Erdelez (1997) studies 
“information encountering”—the “accidental discovery of useful or interesting information”—as a 
distinct aspect of human information behaviour (p. 412). The super-encounterers she interviewed not 
only feel their research benefits from frequent, accidental discoveries of information, but also see 
themselves as acting in ways that encourage such beneficial encounters: “they believed in creating 
situations conducive to encountering” (Erdelez 1997, p. 417, emphasis mine). Thus, individuals can 
develop skills that benefit them both before and after they encounter something unexpected, thereby 
actively enabling serendipitous discovery. 
However, as in the case of the floppy-eared rabbits, conditions beyond the intentions or skills of the 
individual may act as a constraint on serendipitous discovery. Barber and Fox (1958) describe several 
factors that can interfere: limited laboratory resources (running out of rabbits), preconceptions about 
what kinds of discoveries are possible (assumptions about the nature of cartilage), a greater interest in 
an alternative research direction, and time constraints. Abigail McBirnie (2008) observes that the 
researchers and jazz musicians she interviews often recognize potential value in an unexpected 
encounter and yet fail to follow up on that recognition to make a discovery. This is due to what she calls 
“serendipity filters” or “pressures,” including “time, need, responsibility, and environment” (McBirnie 
2008, p. 608). People susceptible to such filters may have a hard time turning toward the value they 
perceive because they feel they cannot turn away from the work they are already engaged with.  
Lori McCay-Peet suggests there are both internal and external precipitating conditions that affect “an 
individual’s ability and inclination to become aware of, respond to, and follow up on a potentially 
serendipitous experience”—these conditions thereby “ultimately impact the outcome” (2011, p. 2). 
Conditions include the physical and social context in which the experience occurs, as well as the more 
general context in which the individual works and lives. The internal conditions McCay-Peet lists are, 
“misleading preconceptions,” “divergent behavior,” and “feelings of frustration” (2011, p. 3). While 
these are examples of individual actions and personal characteristics, they are also the kinds of actions 
and characteristics that are strongly influenced by external conditions such as community attitudes and 
institutional organization. Thus, individuals can and do manipulate conditions so that unexpected 
encounters with new information will more likely occur. Individuals can also exercise some control over 
whether they recognize and follow up on valuable, unexpected encounters. However, the efforts of 
individuals are also constrained by context. 
So on the level of the individual, serendipity is often seen as paradoxical, requiring both luck and skill. 
McBirnie calls this the “paradox of control” (McBirnie 2008, p. 611). She argues that the process aspect 
of serendipity is beyond the control of the individual, highlighting that complex processes are often 
unpredictable. The perception of serendipity, and its results, however, are more susceptible to control: 
the skills involved in such perception and in one’s ability to be adaptive to changing circumstances can 
be developed. But, as just noted, the environment in which the individual is perceiving and acting may 
be such that her skills are constrained, and she cannot follow up despite recognizing the potential value 
in the unexpected. So one must be “lucky” not only in terms of encountering the unexpected, but also in 





The work the category of serendipity does is to differentiate such discoveries from the merely lucky; 
credit is due for the insight that accompanies surprise. Rachel McKinnon (2014) offers some insight into 
the relationship between luck and due credit, in her analysis of the phrase “you make your own luck.” 
McKinnon argues that while it is not technically possible to develop skills that directly increase the luck 
one experiences, it is possible to develop skills that keep one “in the game longer” and thereby increase 
the overall probability that one will be lucky. Super-encounterers and other serendipitous individuals 
seem to have the necessary skills to keep themselves in the game long enough to encounter the 
unexpected more often, to recognize its potential value and then to follow it up.  
Again, beyond having the required skills and therefore deserving credit for their role in the discovery 
process, they must also be in the right time and place—in the right game—for the utilization of those 
skills to lead to success. Some have argued, for instance, that Fleming’s involvement in the discovery of 
penicillin has more to do with his role in the scientific community than with the actual insight he 
displayed in observing P. notatum in his petri dish. 11 He would not have played a role in the particular 
process that led to the valuable outcome, despite his observation, if he had not also been an active lab 
director and educator in the community at the time (Copeland 2015).12 In the following section, I look at 
what kind of scientific community is more likely to encourage rather than constrain the efforts of 
individuals to play a role in a serendipitous discovery.  
 
4. Implications for the Norms and Practice of Science 
Some have argued that the democratization of knowledge production, through recent developments in 
communications technology for instance, increases the likelihood of serendipitous discovery. 
Increasingly diverse groups become involved in science and other intellectual enterprises, exposing each 
other to new sources of knowledge and new ways of knowing (eg: Andriani 2017). Others have argued 
that serendipity occurs most often when individual scientists have free reign to follow their research in 
any chosen direction (Bush 1945, p. 14; see also Bedessem & Ruphy).  
In turn, some have argued that serendipity can be suppressed in a hierarchical system. Toby Sommer 
(2001) calls attention to this by coining the term “Bahramdipity”. Bahram is the Persian king in the fairy 
tale who attempts to foil the princes of Serendip’s efforts to reap the benefits of their wise 
observations. In science, Bahramdipity describes instances of failing to give credit to individuals who 
would have played a role in the discovery process. Sommer’s examples are of scientists whose potential 
discoveries are elided or neglected by those higher up in the hierarchy of the scientific community. One 
famous example is that of Selman Waksman and his graduate student Albert Schatz. Schatz claimed to 
have brought the importance of streptomycin as an antibiotic to Waksman’s attention and to have done 
much of the necessary work, but Waksman was credited with the discovery and received the Nobel 
                                                          
11 Most notably, Fleming himself, who humbly declared during his Nobel Prize Award speech that, “My only merit 
is that I did not neglect the observation and that I pursued the subject as a bacteriologist” (Fleming 1945). 
12 I am far from alone in pointing out, for instance, that others had made similar observations but had lacked the 
timeliness and social connections that Fleming had. A fairly well-known example is the French graduate student 
Ernest Duchesne, whose dissertation reporting on the therapeutic effects of another Penicillium mold was 
submitted in 1897. Duchesne’s work remained unknown and he died a few years later, however, and so his 
preliminary efforts were not taken up to be part of the discovery process that ultimately led to penicillin (see 





Prize. A recent study also shows that bottom-up management of research in science leads to a greater 
number of serendipitous discoveries (Murayama et al. 2015). The suggestion, then, is that undirected, 
egalitarian communities of independent scientists are more likely to generate serendipitous discoveries 
than communities with leaders and specific goals. 
However, this suggestion raises the following question: if each scientist works in isolation toward their 
own desired ends, how does science itself fare as a consequence? For one, contemporary science is 
complex, both in terms of theory and tools—how can any one scientist have the necessary knowledge 
and resources to achieve progress, without the help of others?13 Also, if the goals of these individualized 
scientists are for personal profit, how can we ensure the practice of science generates knowledge 
valuable to society as a whole?  
These questions have been taken up by an ongoing discussion in philosophy of science regarding the 
possible conflict between the priority rule in science—that the first scientists to complete a discovery 
process get all the credit for that discovery—and the imperative to share knowledge in the interest of 
scientific progress overall.14 It seems that if a scientist or group seeks credit for a discovery, they have an 
interest in keeping their knowledge to themselves until the discovery process is complete. This, 
however, prevents other scientists (and society) from accessing the knowledge being produced by that 
process until the discovery is made. I argue that because this delay not only affects the time it may take 
for the discovery to be made, by decreasing the likelihood of cooperation, for example. It also affects 
the potential for serendipitous discovery. Consequently, there is an additional, personal reason for an 
individual scientist to want to share her knowledge, because it improves her chances overall of playing a 
role in the completion of a discovery process.  
Recent work on this has been an effort to reconcile a scientist’s personal desire for garnering credit for 
making a discovery with what Merton called the “communist norm” of science (Strevens forthcoming; 
Heesen forthcoming). Michael Strevens argues that the priority rule plays an important part in science 
as an incentive for individual scientists to work toward potentially valuable discoveries; they desire the 
prestige that making a discovery will grant them, and so through the work of individual, ambitious 
scientists, science benefits overall from their discoveries (Strevens 2003). Despite the role of 
competition between scientists and groups, however, both Strevens and Remco Heesen provide 
arguments for why it nevertheless benefits individual scientists to subscribe to a communist approach to 
science, or “total sharing” of information. I suggest that a similar argument can be made from 
serendipity. 
To return to the features of serendipity described above, I have argued that it emerges, unpredicted, 
from the processes of scientific practice and communication. Thus, no one scientist can say ahead of 
time that she will play a role in a serendipitous discovery process, let alone in its completion. Epistemic 
expectations determine when serendipity will occur, by defining what counts as unexpected. Insofar as 
epistemic expectations are overturned by serendipity, the occurrence of serendipity (the reflection upon 
the unexpected significance of a source of knowledge, for instance) will alter the future expectations of 
individual scientists and potentially of the community of scientists as a whole. 
                                                          
13 Aspects of these first two questions are often discussed under the problem of the division of cognitive labour 
(see Kitcher 1990; Weisburg & Muldoon 2009, for examples).  





From the perspective of an individual scientist, she may be blind to the ultimate value of some of what 
she publishes.15 A contribution she makes to science by publishing her intermediate results, for instance, 
may unexpectedly result in her involvement in another discovery process. On the other hand, some 
other scientist may publish his intermediate results and thereby unexpectedly contribute to a discovery 
process she will gain the prestige for having completed. The information produced along the way to one 
discovery, that is, may contribute to other research outcomes in ways not predicted by the scientists 
involved in that underlying discovery process, serendipitously. 
The potential for the publication of intermediate results to benefit both science and the individual 
scientist has been argued for by Thomas Boyer (2014). He points to a distinction between community 
norms that allow an individual to benefit from the publication of intermediate results, and norms that 
do not. Specifically, in a community in which publishing the end result of a discovery process receives far 
more credit than publishing an intermediate result, the individual lacks incentive to publish early. Boyer 
suggests that, if a community wanted to encourage early publications, it could be better to 
“acknowledge the value of preliminary and intermediate steps, instead of emphasizing only the 
achievement of the last step (and keeping only “big names” for history’s records)” (Boyer 2014, p. 27). If 
preliminary and intermediate steps were more widely acknowledged as being essential for serendipitous 
discovery, I suggest, they would have higher value. This goes hand in hand with widening the scope of 
credit due for enabling scientific discovery to include unexpected sources of valuable knowledge.  
As an example, take the discussion concerning the role that Rosalind Franklin played in the discovery of 
the structure of DNA. As James Watson (2010) tells it in his autobiographical account, the process of this 
discovery was marked by serendipity, one instance of which was the happening upon Franklin’s 
crystallographic images, which inspired Watson and Francis Crick to think in terms of a helix. A footnote 
in the original Nature publication of the model Watson and Crick came up with thanked Franklin for 
“stimulating” them with a “general knowledge” of her research results (Watson & Crick 1953, pp. 737-
8). Thus, from one perspective, Watson’s encounter with Franklin was fortunate happenstance, and he 
was lucky to have gained the knowledge he needed from an unexpected resource. From another 
perspective, Franklin contributed to the process of discovery as a fellow scientist. The perception of a 
discovery as serendipitous points to the recognition that it was enabled by something unexpected. 
When our expectations shift, however, for example from thinking Watson was wise in seeing the worth 
of Franklin’s work to thinking Franklin was deserving of credit for her contribution to the discovery, our 
perception of the nature of the serendipity involved also shifts. Rather than being wise for recognizing 
the value of an accidental finding, Watson was fortunate to have made a particular social connection 
and to benefit from another’s work. Since Watson’s autobiographical account was published, it has 
become common to suggest that what led Watson to see his access to Franklin’s research as 
serendipitous reflected a mistaken expectation about her ability (as a woman) to contribute to his 
scientific discovery process. Whether or not this interpretation is correct, it reflects a general belief that 
such expectations (should) have changed over time. 16   
                                                          
15 As Strevens (forthcoming) points out, not only data is of value when it comes to sharing scientific knowledge. In 
keeping with the variations of serendipity I have described above, all sorts of information might have unexpected 
value, enabling a discovery by making it timely or by creating a social connection between scientists that leads to 
the exchange of further information, for example.  
16 A further factor in the discussion over Franklin’s contribution to this discovery concerns whether Watson and 





Perhaps paradoxically, a scientific community whose members are more likely to take advantage of 
opportunities for serendipitous discovery is also more likely to recognize the control it can exercise over 
who (and what) is perceived as a possible source of new knowledge. Consider as a counterexample 
Kantorovich’s “naturalistic” depiction of serendipity in science. The observation of an anomaly, 
reasoning about its potential value for scientific knowledge, and the acceptance of this observation as 
potentially valuable by the broader scientific community are, as Kantorovich (1993) argues, processes 
guided by epistemic norms. Scientists do not take the time to attend to an unusual observation nor do 
they take up such an observation into processes of investigation and inquiry unless they believe it has 
epistemic worth, and epistemic worth is determined according to the norms of scientific knowledge. But 
Kantorovich argues that this process operates fully at the group level, in the form of a “collective brain,” 
and is therefore as unintentional as evolution itself (1993, p. 211). However, because the scientific 
community is made up of individual members, it is not the scientific community in the abstract but 
rather individual scientists whose actions and behaviour maintain (and sometimes change) the norms of 
their community.  
As I suggested in the previous section, some control may be exercised over serendipity by the individual, 
insofar as she can cultivate the associated skills. Serendipity-related skills may also be cultivated by a 
community that, for instance, utilizes generative doubt, as Honda did in the example given by Cunha and 
colleagues and above. Generative doubt in relation to the norms of epistemic expectations would 
require an approach somewhat like the following: A scientific community that has developed 
appropriate epistemic norms about what kinds of methods and observations, for example, can be 
expected to produce scientific knowledge, may also be skilled in adapting those norms when surprising 
events call those expectations into question. In contrast to an organism that evolves through mutations 
and natural selection, then, a serendipitous scientific community is a group that can intend to learn from 
their experience with the unexpected. Further, such a community will be more adaptive to the broader 
needs of society: when problems arise, the cultivation of adaptive skills and the ability to take up the 
work of others quickly into a discovery process can result in more timely and effective responses to 
those problems (Michener et al. 2009).  
In sum, a community that learns to expect the unexpected might also readily acknowledge the potential 
value of preliminary and intermediate results, alongside the value of competition and the priority rule. 
That is, serendipity does not exist without the underlying process, in relation to which its outcome is 
oblique. But the expectations that ground the intentions that drive that process, in a self-reflecting 
community, will themselves shift as the community learns about the limits of its own expectations. 
Therefore, serendipity will continue to be a relevant category for describing discoveries, insofar as what 
expected (and consequently, what is unexpected) is a shifting ground.17 In a scientific community with 
serendipity-based norms, such as one that adopts generative doubt toward its own epistemic norms, 
individual scientists will continue to have the same chances of being serendipitously involved in the 
completion of a discovery process. In this way, awareness of the potential for serendipity results in a 
democratization of knowledge-production, by widening the scope of expectations about potential 
                                                          
discussion for determining Franklin’s role and offers a complementary approach to the discovery in her article, 
“Reassessing Discovery” (Gibbons 2012). 






sources of knowledge, without also resulting in the wholesale individualization of the pursuit of 
discovery.  
As a final point, I return to the problem of whether this kind of community encourages individuals to 
exercise the relevant skills and to play a role in serendipitous discovery. I argue that it does, in the same 
way that it improves the economy of research. That is, as Thagard (2002) points out, contexts in which 
experiments can be done without high costs to the overall research programme—requiring too much 
time, attention, or material resources—are conducive to serendipity. This may be, for example, because 
experiments can be done that initially seem unnecessary, or unimportant, but that can sometimes result 
in the accidental discovery of valuable knowledge. Such was the case in Patrick Lee’s path to discovery 
of the potential value of the reovirus for cancer research: He allowed one of his graduate students to 
conduct an experiment that Lee assumed would reveal nothing interesting, but which had a surprising 
result. Further, because it was economical to repeat the experiment, hypotheses of error and 
coincidence could be ruled out to conclude that, indeed, an interesting anomalous result had been 
obtained (Thagard 2002, pp. 86-87).18 Serendipity does not occur as a result of “blindly stumbling on 
important phenomena” or through simple trial and error, but rather during the course of normal 
scientific work (Thagard and Croft 1999, p. 128). The more scientific work that can be done, the more 
likely a discovery might occur—there is both an increase in opportunities for chance observations and 
an increased possibility that such observations will be followed up.  
The early publication of results, as Boyer (2014) alludes, improves the economy of research by 
preventing the unnecessary repetition of discovery-related work. Likewise, a community in which 
knowledge is regularly shared decreases the burden on its individual members for doing that work by 
improving the chances they will (unexpectedly) come across results that are useful. It thereby also 
improves the chances that an individual scientist’s efforts will result in a discovery, by making it more 
possible that her published results will be taken up by someone else. Individualized constraints such as 
pressures on time, resources and attention are thereby mitigated by one’s role as a node in the greater 
network of science. In this way, scientists are kept “in the game” longer when they publish more 
(preliminary, intermediate) results of their research, and consequently there is a higher probability that 
the exercise of their skills will lead to them playing a role in a serendipitous discovery process.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has sought to define serendipity as it exists in the practice of science, to delineate its key 
features, and to illustrate how taking serendipity seriously grounds specific normative frameworks and 
approaches to publication practices. I have argued that serendipity is an emergent property of scientific 
discoveries, describing an oblique relationship between the outcome of a discovery process and the 
intentions that drove it forward. Further, the conditions that generate one instance of serendipity are 
also thereby changed by it.  
                                                          
18 Howard Gest points to a similar factor in his recounting of serendipity in the isolation of the vitamin C 
molecule—the fact that one group of scientists had a much faster and less costly test available to them allowed for 





Serendipity is often conceived of as a “flash of insight” or a “eureka” moment, triggered by an 
unexpected observation or event. I have shown that, particularly in the context of scientific practice and 
scientific discovery, serendipity can be complex. A serendipitous discovery process may involve several 
unexpected observations and events, and may entail the formation of a network of interactions 
between individuals from various communities, backgrounds and even times. Therefore, serendipity in 
science is better seen as a process that occurs within (and sometimes beyond) the scientific community, 
if we are to understand how it emerges from scientific practice. 
I argue that the most important aspect of serendipity is its role in disrupting and changing epistemic 
expectations, in particular about the kinds of discoveries that might be made and where they may 
originate. Science has specific epistemic norms about the methods and types of observations likely to 
produce knowledge. Further, scientists have expectations about who might have the knowledge they 
need. When a discovery is retrospectively categorized as serendipitous, it is because somewhere along 
the process of that discovery an unexpected event, observation or source of knowledge led to an 
unimagined outcome. 
Because individuals and even communities can cultivate skills that allow them both to perceive the 
potential value in the unexpected more readily and to adapt and act to follow up on that value, 
serendipity can, to a degree, be controlled. This is paradoxical on the individual level, insofar as the 
individual cannot control the rest of serendipity. Rather, environmental and even internalized 
constraints that reflect the norms and resources of their community and context can prevent individuals 
from utilizing the skills they have. Thus, serendipity requires both luck and skill.  
It is not paradoxical when we look to the level of the scientific community, as the space in which 
serendipitous processes of discovery occur. That is, some community norms and practices can 
circumvent the paradox through mitigation. For instance, communities that share information readily 
not only create opportunities for unexpected discoveries to occur. Sharing information also improves 
the economy of research overall, meaning that more scientists can share the work to be done on any 
particular discovery process. Consequently, opportunities for utilizing the relevant skills of perception 
and adaptation will both be more frequent and more effective from the perspective of individuals.  
In conclusion, if we acknowledge both the prevalence and importance of serendipity to the practice of 
science, and want to encourage it, more needs to be done than ensuring different kinds of scientists 
casually meet up at the lab water cooler. The role of epistemic expectations needs to be taken seriously, 
and each member of the scientific community ought to participate both in exposing the limitations of 
those expectations and by contributing knowledge to the broader network. While further 
recommendations could be made, I have here argued that at least one aspect of a scientific community, 
the regular sharing of knowledge so that it can be taken up by other scientists, will encourage 
serendipitous discovery.  
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